Recent events have clearly illustrated that these concepts of freedom of the press and personal privacy are at risk. Security forces, in their efforts to do their jobs, ie protect citizens, have been increasing the sophistication of their spying efforts on enemies and friends alike. A new law with sweeping ramifications for society is being debated in the Canadian HoC this week. It is essential that all citizens understand what is at stake but it is especially important that academics, researchers and journalists have a clear picture.
What is at stake for journalists in Canada with C-51?
Canadian Civil Liberties Association
Law Professors: Craig Forcese and Kent Roach Assessment
https://cdnantiterrorismlawaudit.wordpress.com/
Should we be concerned?
Helpful Theoretical Frameworks
Clay Shirky is a media theorist who gained prominence for the theories proposed in his book, "Here Comes Everybody" where he described and explained some of the impacts of the web on communications. Shirky has written a chapter for an upcoming book "Journalism After Snowden" that develops many important themes and suggests even more profound effects of the world wide information revolution and reactions. Discussing investigative journalism in light of recent events in the US with respect to whistleblowers and protection of journalistic sources he says:
So what should journalists and publications do to maximize their ability to report newsworthy stories and minimize government interference? Three broad skills are required.Tools and techniques:
First and most importantly, reporters have to get good at encrypted communication. (It would be useful if news organizations began encrypting even routine communication, to avoid signaling to the governments they cover when something particularly important is happening, and to provide cover to sensitive sources.) Encryption is not an IT function; individual reporters have to become comfortable sending and receiving encrypted email, at a minimum. And, as was the case with both Manning and Snowden, it’s important to recognize—and to get the source to recognize—that encryption is no guarantee that a source won’t eventually be identified. It is a tool for buying time, not guaranteeing anonymity.
Second, journalists and institutions in contact with leakers need to have a plan for involving other journalists or institutions located in a different jurisdiction. While the leaks that get the most attention are national scale, we can expect additional leaks from inside businesses and local governments. It may be valuable to have a New Jersey newspaper holding vital documents about a sheriff in Colorado, to make sure the Colorado paper can’t be successfully pressured to withhold them. (This “doomsday switch” scenario seems to have been used by John McAfee, in his fight with the government of Belize, an indication that the pattern extends beyond journalism.)
And third, both journalists and publications should figure out to whom they might be useful as a third-party recipient of some other journalist’s or publication’s secrets. In moments of crisis (and important leaks tend to precipitate crises), those in need of backup will turn to people they already trust. If you are a journalist, editor, or publisher, ask yourself which other publications, anywhere in the world, would turn to you if they needed backup?
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